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TREATY TERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT
SENATE OR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL: THE
CASE OF THE TAIWAN TREATY*
by Nancy J Murray
In an address to the American public on December 15, 1978, President
Carter announced that full diplomatic relations would be established with
Communist China. In normalizing relations with Peking, the President
signed a joint communique that acknowledged the Communist Chinese
position that there is only one China, The Peoples Republic of China,
which includes Taiwan. Subsequently, the President, acting without prior
consultation with Congress or, in particular, the Senate, gave notice to Taiwan that the United States intended to terminate the Mutual Defense
Treaty of 1954.1 Such notice was pursuant to article X of the treaty, which
provided that either party could terminate the treaty following one year's
notice to the other party.2 On December 22, 1978, Senator Barry Goldwater, joined by eight fellow Senators,' a former Senator,4 and seventeen
members of the House of Representatives,5 filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia against President Carter and
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.6 The suit alleged that President Carter
did not have constitutional authority to terminate the treaty with Taiwan
without the advice and consent of the Senate or the approval of both
Houses of Congress.7 The issue of whether the power to terminate treaties
belongs to the President alone, the President and the Senate, or the President and Congress has provoked much confficting commentary.' No judi* On Oct. 17, 1979, after this Comment went to print, U.S. District Judge Oliver
Gasch ruled that President Carter acted improperly in terminating the Mutual Defense
Treaty with Taiwan without approval of two-thirds of the Senate or the approval of a
majority of the full Congress. President Carter has filed an immediate appeal in the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1954, United StatesRepublic of China on Taiwan, 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
2. 6 U.S.T. at 437. Article X of the treaty provides: "This Treaty shall remain in force

indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other
Party."
3. Members of the Senate joining Senator Goldwater (R) include Senators Jake Gan

(R), Orrin Hatch (R), Jesse A. Helms (R), Gordon Humphrey (R), Paul Laxalt (R), James
A. McClure (R), and Strom Thurmond (R).

4. Former Senator Carl Curtis (R)joined in the action.

5. Members of the House of Representatives joining the suit include Congressmen
John Ashbrook (R), Robert Bauman (R), Clair W. Burgener (R), James M. Collins (R),
Robert Daniel, Jr. (R), Robert K. Dornan (R), Mickey Edwards (R), Newt Gingrich (R),

George Hansen (R), Ken Kramer (R), Larry McDonald (D), J. Danforth Quayle (R), Eldon
Rudd (R), John Harbin Rousselot (R), Bob Stump (D), Steve Symms (R), and Don Young

(R).

6. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 22, 1978).
7. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3.
8. Opinions of constitutional law scholars diverge. Some scholars argue that past practices of Presidents in effectively terminating treaties are conclusive evidence that the President has that power. The answer is thought to rest more heavily on precedent than on
constitutional law. Note that this view is espoused by Senator Edward Kennedy as evi-
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cial decision, however, has directly addressed this question. With a
judicial challenge to the President's actions now pending, the issue may
finally be resolved. This Comment discusses the nature of treaties, the
treaty-making process, and the history of treaty-termination practices.
Special emphasis is given to issues that arise in Goldwater v. Carter,9 including who has standing to challenge the President's independent termination of a treaty and, more importantly, whether such a challenge
presents a justiciable controversy.
denced by his article Normal Relations with China.- Good Law, Good Policy, 65 A.B.A.J. 194
(1979). Other scholars contend that the silence in the Constitution concerning the location
of the treaty-termination power indicates that the President alone has the power to terminate
a treaty as an international obligation, although perhaps not as binding municipal law. I W.
WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 584585 (2d ed. 1930). Still other scholars reason that the termination of a treaty is an exercise of
power similar to that involved in the making of a treaty; therefore, since senatorial concurrence is necessary to make a treaty, similar senatorial concurrence is required to terminate
that treaty. See Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in International Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 660-62 (1937); Taft,
The Boundariesbetween the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599, 610 (1916). A fourth view suggests that if the treaty provides for
unilateral termination, policy considerations and special circumstances may make it necessary to obtain congressional or senatorial concurrence either before or after the President
terminates the treaty. 14 M.

WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

461-62 (1970);

see Reisman & McDougal, Can the President UnilaterallyEnd Treaties?, NAT'L L.J., May
28, 1979, at 17 ("Ordinarily. .. a joint resolution would be required to terminate a treaty
... . [although] there could be constitutional justifications. .. [in light of exigent circumstances] for consultations only after the fact."). Another viewpoint, expressed by Irwin S.
Rhodes, author-editor of THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL (1969), holds that:
Just as the power to legislate implies the power to repeal in the same manner
and the power to judge implies the power to revoke or overrule in the same
manner, so that same principle applies to treaties. If such be the case, as I
firmly believe, the revocation of a treaty by the President without the advice
and consent of the Senate is unconstitutional and notice by him of intended
termination is a nullity.
125 CONG. REC. S7046 (daily ed. June 6, 1979). Professor Edward Gaffney, Jr., assistant
director of the Center for Constitutional Studies at Notre Dame Law School, has a similar
belief. Professor Gaffney has observed:
If the President is under the duty, in Article II, to take care, to see that the laws
are faithfully executed, and if then Article VI defines law to include and to
embrace treaties, then it seems to me that the normal route would be to go
back to the House and Senate for a majority vote, just the normal way that
you unmake an act.
125 CONG. REC. S7046 (daily ed. June 6, 1979). Professor Thomas S. Franck, director,
Center for International Studies of the New York University School of Law, reasons that
"treaties are the supreme law of the land, that laws and treaties, in the words of the Supreme
Court in Whitney v. Robertson are on the same footing as laws and must be terminated as if
they were laws, either by a legislative resolution or by inconsistent subsequent law." 125
CONG. REC. S7046 (daily ed. June 6, 1979). A well-known scholar, Professor Eugene V.
Rostow, summed up his position by stating:
It cannot be constitutional to allow the President to abrogate treaties by a
stroke of his pen. Can the President alone nullify our solemn national commitment to NATO? The President's duty is to see that treaties and statutes are
"faithfully executed." He has no power to repeal them. Such a doctrine
would make nonsense of the separation of powers, and indeed establish an
Imperial Presidency.
125 CONG. REC. S7047 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
9. No. 78-2412 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 22, 1978). See notes 186-94 infra and accompanying text for discussion of the initial ruling by the court.
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I.

TREATIES IN GENERAL

Agreements between nations assume many forms and are referred to by
various descriptive terms, including treaties, conventions, acts, protocols,
and agreements."0 The term "treaty" usually designates a formal agreement of a political or quasi-political nature, such as treaties of peace, commerce, and mutual defense; the term, however, is not limited to such
instruments.'l Treaties existed in ancient 2 and medieval times,' 3 but did
not become prominent until the seventeenth century. 4 During this period
it became the custom among European nations to conclude wars with a
treaty that purported to resolve all disputes. 5 The right of sovereign powers to negotiate and complete treaties subsequently evolved into an established principle of international law. 6 Countries have continued to
exercise this right and have acknowledged that an essentially legal obliga10. 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1943).
11. Id,'see Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (treaty may be defined as compact between independent nations depending on enforcement through interest and honor of
parties to it); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 571 (1840) (treaty is an instrument
written and executed with formalities customary among nations); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dali.) 199, 271-72 (1796) (treaty is solemn promise by whole nation that terms will be observed). See also C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 94-95 (4th ed. 1965) (treaties are compacts between sovereign states to create new rights and duties or to clarify existing ones); G.
WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 76 (3d ed. 1939) ("treaty" may be loosely
used as a general term to designate any form of international agreement); Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (Harvard Law School) art. l(a), 29
A.J.I.L. Supp. 653, 686 (1935) (treaties are formal instruments of agreement under international law whereby States establish relations between themselves). Note that the international juridical effect of a treaty is not dependent upon the name given to the instrument. 5
G. HACKWORTH, supra note 8, at 2.
12. The Bible refers to the existence of treaties, such as the one in which Israel agreed to
allow the Gibeonites to live with them in the Promised Land. 9 Joshua3:27. Both Roman
and Grecian civilizations made use of treaties. See 1 T. WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE LAW
OF NATIONS § 22, at 34, §§ 30-39, at 47-61, § 46, at 79 (1899). See generally I C. BUTLER,
THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES § 110, at 191-92 (1902).
13. T. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 158-59 (6th
ed. 1897).
14. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648, evidenced by a treaty between the principal nations of Europe, is thought by many scholars to mark the beginning of the history of modem
international law and the progress of European civilization. See 1 C. BUTLER, supra note
12, at 203. See general,y H. WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN EUROPE AND
AMERICA; FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, 1842, at 69 (New
York 1845); T. WALKER, supra note 12, at 147-48.
15. See 1 C. BUTLER, supra note 12, at 203-04. See also 1 G. CHALMERS, A COLLECTION OF TREATIES 340-90 (London 1790) (Treaty of Utrecht between France and Great
Britain upon termination of War of Spanish Succession); id. at 424-42 (Treaty of Aix-laChapelle between England, France, Netherlands, and other powers upon termination of
War of Austrian Succession); id. at 467-83 (Treaty of Paris between England, France, Spain,
and Portugal upon termination of Seven Years' War).
16. Cases reflecting this principle include Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,
597 (1937) ("sovereigns may contract without derogating from their sovereignty"); Perry v.
United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935) ("the right to make binding obligations is a competence attaching to sovereignty"). See I C. BUTLER, supra note 12, at 204-05. See also H.
WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 252, at 328 (8th ed. Boston 1866), re-

printed in 19

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE CLASSICS OF IN-

TERNATIONAL LAW 274 (1936) (power to negotiate and conclude treaties exists in "every
sovereign state which has not parted with this portion of its sovereignty, or agreed to modify
its exercise by compact with other states").
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tion, similar to that which the law attaches to contracting parties, is impressed upon treaty-making parties.' 7
II.

THE TREATY-MAKING PROCESS

The formation of treaties is governed by the constitution or the fundamental law of each nation; consequently, each nation is restrained only by
self-imposed limitations or by the recognition of such limitations in other
nations." In the United States, the treaty-making power is an important
19 Both the
aspect of the federal government's function in foreign affairs.
scope and structure of this power, however, are vague.20 History reveals
17. See 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY
THE UNITED STATES § 489, at 1369 (2d rev. ed. 1947). "Recognition of legal restraints arising from treaty has thus been a natural consequence of an experience characterized by an
acknowledgment of the legal nature of obligations not recorded in definite agreements, and
for which, nevertheless, the society of nations has united in demanding observance." Id. at
1370 (footnote omitted). See also Address of Premiers Millerand and Lloyd-George to the
United States in relation to the Fiume Controversy (Feb. 17, 1920), reprintedin 59 CONG.
REC. 3550-51 (1920), in which they state that World War I began in an effort to force Germany to respect the treaty made eighty years earlier involving the neutrality of Belgium. See
generaly North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration (United States v. Great Britain), Hague
Ct. Rep. 104 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910), reprintedin G. WILSON, THE HAGUE ARBITRATION

CASES 145, 166 (1915) (every state must execute treaty obligations or be subject to ordinary
sanctions of international law for failure to do so; such sanctions include appeal to public
opinion, publication of correspondence, break in relations, and public reprisal). But see S.
Doc. No. 106, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 502, 509, 515 (1919), in which President Wilson stated in
a conference with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that ratification of a treaty
with Germany would involve a solemn moral obligation binding in conscience only and not
in law, because no sanction existed in the treaty.
18. 1 C. BUTLER, supra note 12, § 113, at 196 (views of Dr. Henry Wheaton); see H.
WHEATON, supra note 14, at 135.
19.

See S. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT I (2d ed. 1916).

20. Although certain foreign affairs powers are granted by the Constitution, there is no
constitutional delegation of a general power to conduct foreign affairs to any of the federal
branches of government. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
317-18 (1936), in which Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority of the court, stated that
prior to the Constitution, the power over foreign affairs vested solely in the federal government as a necessary concomitant of nationality. Justice Sutherland reasoned that this power,
including the power to make treaties, remains in force in modern times since it was not
dependent upon an affirmative grant in the Constitution initially and was subsequently limited only by express terms in the Constitution. See Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power.An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 479 (1946). For cases
prior to Curtiss-Wright that hold that sovereignty is a source of foreign affairs power, see
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States
(The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604-06 (1889). One problem arising from the
limited grant of foreign affairs powers in the Constitution is the lack of direction as to how
such powers are to be distributed among the federal branches. See generall Henkin, The
Treaty Makers andthe Law Makers.- The Law of the Land andForeign Relations, 107 U. PA.
L. REV. 903, 913, 915 n.26 (1956). But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952), in which the Court stated that the executive power was readily distinguishable from legislative power. A second problem stems from the fact that many foreign affairs
powers are neither implied in the Constitution nor designated as a power belonging to the
President or to Congress. For example, does the power to proclaim neutrality towards involvement in foreign conflicts belong to Congress by virtue of its authority to declare war
and to regulate foreign commerce, or to the President by virtue of his authority in the area of
relations with other nations and as Commander-in-Chief? The sources of such powers are,
therefore, difficult to determine. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION

27-28 (1972). See also Riesenfeld, supra note 8, at 643. For special studies on treaties, see E.
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that this power was of special concern to the constitutional framers. 2 '
They were anxious to abandon the treaty-making process delineated in the
Articles of Confederation, whereby the Senate appointed and then monitored negotiators, rejecting or approving their final product. 22 The prevailing attitude at the Constitutional Convention was that treaties should be
difficult to make in order to ensure that they would not be lightly completed.2 3 Moreover, the framers wanted to assure that treaties made by the
United States would be honored by the individual states. 24 To accomplish
these goals, the framers (1) vested the treaty-making power in the President, but only with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senators
present,25 (2) forbade treaty-making by the states, 26 and (3) declared that
treaties entered into by the United States shall be the supreme law of the
land.27
In theory, the President and the Senate are associated throughout the
process of making treaties. In practice, however, the treaty-making process
is generally divided into three separate parts: negotiation by the President
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1917); Comment, Treaties
and the Supreme Court, I U. CHI. L. REV. 602 (1933).

21. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 483 (J. Jay) (J. Hamilton ed. 1880). John Jay wrote:
The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to
war, peace, and commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode,
and with such precautions, as will afford the highest security that it will be
exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most
conducive to the public good.
See S. CRANDALL, supra note 19, at 19.
22. Under the Articles of Confederation, the entire treaty-making process was vested in
the Senate. L. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 129.

23. See 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 507 (1901) (both the President and Senate are
necessary to complete a treaty in order to ensure a check upon the branches and to ensure
security to the people) (remarks of Mr. Wilson during the Constitutional Convention); 11
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 38-39 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1907) ("[O]n the subject of
treaties, our system is to have none with any nation, as far as can be avoided.").
24. L. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 373 n.3 (failure of states to observe treaties made by
Congress was major factor giving rise to Constitutional Convention). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 138 (A. Hamilton) (J. Hamilton ed. 1880); id.No. 22, at 184 (A. Hamilton);
id. No. 42, at 329 (J. Madison). See generally 2 J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 327 (1908).
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 provides: "The President. . . .shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur .... "
26. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10 provides: "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation . .

.

.No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, .

.

. enter into any

...
For cases disAgreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.
cussing these constitutional restrictions on the states as to treaty-making, see Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519-20 (1893); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 574
(1840); Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185 (1837). See also 5 G. HACKWORTH, supranote
10, at 24. See generaly The Constitution of the UnitedStates of America, S. Doc. No. 232,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 366, 368 (1936); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF

§ 1403, at 276 (5th ed. 1891).
27. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2 provides:

THE UNITED STATES

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
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alone, consent to ratification by the Senate, followed by final ratification
by the President.2 8 Thus, what was intended to be one authority consisting
of two closely collaborating organs has split into "two, usually rival...
authorities, performing sharply differentiated functions." 29
A.

The President'sRole

Since the power to make treaties is given to the President by article II of
the Constitution, which grants executive powers,3" treaty-making has often
been labeled an executive function. 3 1 Many constitutional scholars, however, have distinguished the making of treaties from other exercises of
Presidential power, principally because of the Senate's role in the process,
and because treaties have particular legal and political qualities and consequences. 32 Treaty-making has even been viewed as a function of a fourth
branch of government, the President-and-Senate. 33 Despite the debate
over whether the treaty-making power is legislative, executive, or a blend
of both, the President's role is largely clear. In modern times, the actual
initiation and negotiation of treaties is, by the weight of both practice and
opinion, a power of the President alone.34 Nonetheless, many Presidents
remain in touch with senatorial sentiment as to pending negotiations
through the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.3 5 After negotiations
are completed by the President, he then ratifies the treaty provided the
Senate has consented to such ratification.36 Should the Senate condition
its consent upon acceptance by the President of an amendment or reservation,37 the President, as well as the other party or parties to the treaty, has
28. The Senate gives consent to ratification while the President ratifies treaties. Several
Supreme Court decisions, however, erroneously refer to the Senate's action as ratification.
Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 526 (1957); B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583,
600-01 (1912). See E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 168 (14th
ed. 1978). See also L. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 130.
29. See E. CORWIN, supra note 28, at 129.
30. See note 5 supra.
31. See L. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 42-43, 130. Butsee 6 J. MADISON, WRITINGS 138
(1910) ("[tlhere are sufficient indications that the power.

.

.[to make] treaties is regarded by

the Constitution as materially different from mere executive power, and as having more
affinity to the legislative than to the executive character").
32. L. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 130.
33. The treaty-making power appears to be a distinct power that belongs to neither the

legislative nor the executive branch. Qualities of the President that are indispensable in the
management of foreign negotiations favor the executive as the most fit agent for those transactions. Yet, the operation of treaties as law strongly indicates the need for the participation

of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in making treaties. THE FEDERALIST No.

75, at 557-58 (A. Hamilton) (J. Hamilton ed. 1880). See generally C. HYDE, supra note 17, at
1388-90; J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, reprintedinJ. LOCKE,
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 143-148 (P. Laslett ed. 1967).

34. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
35. See E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 34 (1944). The
Senate created the Committee on Foreign Relations as a standing comittee in 1816 in an
attempt to reconcile the two rival and often antagonistic branches. See text accompanying

note 43 infra.
36. See text accompanying notes 45-48 infra.
37. An amendment, if accepted by the President and other party or parties to the treaty,
changes the treaty for all parties. A reservation, on the other hand, merely limits the obligations of the United States. Amendments appear most frequently in bilateral treaties, while

1979]

COMMENTS

38
the power to refuse to proceed with that treaty.

B.

The Senate's Role

Although as originally conceived, the Senate was to act as an advisory
council to the President throughout the treaty-making process,39 this format was soon discarded.4" Few Presidents other than George Washington
have talked to the Senate about a forthcoming treaty, 4' nor has advice
often been sought or given through the exchange of messages. 42 Thus, the
full Senate does not formally advise the President on treaties before or
during negotiations. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however,
does serve as an informal liaison between the President and the Senate,
alerting the President to potential Senate reaction to treaties later
presented for the Senate's consent.43 In addition, individual Senators occasionally assist in treaty negotiations by sharing with the President and
his negotiators their sense of what the Senate will be willing to accept.
These Senators are then in a better position to discuss and defend the
treaty when the treaty later appears before the Senate for consent to ratification.44
After a treaty has been submitted to the Senate, the Senate must consent
reservations often appear in general international treaties such as the United Nations Charter. See E. CORWIN, supra note 28, at 130. See also L. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 133-36.
38. The treaty must contain the whole contract between the parties, and the Senate may
consent to only those terms agreed upon by the parties. Although the Senate does have
power to refuse to consent or to condition its consent upon adoption of amendments, the
Senate has no power to introduce new terms obligatory upon the other party. Fourteen
Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 83 (1901) (concurring opinion).
39. See THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 483, (J. Jay) (J. Hamilton ed. 1880). See also E.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 207-10 (4th ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited to as E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT].

40. The language of the Constitution envisions treaty-making as one continuing process
performed by a single authority: the President acting with the advice and consent of the
Senate. In practice, however, the President and Senate bifurcated into separate functions: a
Presidential function of formulation and negotiation followed by a senatorial function of
criticism and amendment or rejection. See E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD

ORGANIZATION, supra note 35, at 36. Compare United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936), in which the Court stated that the President, as the constitutional representative of the United States, manages relationships with foreign nations and,
therefore, is the most competent to determine when negotiations will be most successful.
The Senate interferes with this Presidential responsibility and, thus, impairs the national
security.
41. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 39, at 209-10. President Washington
once sought from the Senate immediate answers to questions raised by an Indian treaty then
under negotiation. The Senate, however, immersed itself in prolonged debate and parliamentary wrangling, causing much delay and frustration to Washington. See R. HAYDEN,
THE SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789-1817, at 16-29 (1920).
42. The possibility of early leaks concerning treaty negotiations by the Senate to a foreign government is a major reason why the President does not confide in the Senate until
negotiations are concluded. For examples of Senate leaks despite self-imposed commitments to secrecy, see W. HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE 16, 93 n.32, 95, 138
n.66, 139 n.67, 167-68, 183, 193, 217 (1933). See also S. CRANDALL, supra note 19, at 68-75;
L. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 131.
43. See note 35 supra.
44. Id.; see L. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 131-32.
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before the treaty can be ratified by the President.45 The Senate has the
power to condition this consent by requiring the addition of an amendment or reservation, 46 which often forces the President to renegotiate the
treaty.47 Should the President or the other party to the treaty reject such
conditions, however, the Senate is powerless to interfere with the President's decision not to complete the treaty. The Senate, therefore, has
power only over those treaties actually presented to it. It cannot create a
new treaty and force the President to ratify its terms. Once the Senate has
given, withheld, or conditioned its consent, its role in the treaty-making
process is concluded. 48 The final power to complete the treaty once the
Senate has consented, or to accept the conditions once the Senate has modified the treaty, lies in the President.
III. THE HISTORY OF TREATY-TERMINATION PRACTICES IN THE
UNITED STATES

A treaty is essentially a contract between two nations, and as such it may
be terminated under various circumstances. 49 The instance of termination
45. The requirement of Senate consent before a treaty is ratified by the President is an
important check on Presidential power to make foreign policy by treaty. See L. HENKIN,
supra note 20, at 132-33. See also text accompanying note 28 supra.
46. See text accompanying note 37 supra. The power of the Senate to condition its
consent has been upheld by the Supreme Court. Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States,
183 U.S. 176, 182 (1901) (Brown, J., concurring). The legal effect of a Senate reservation
was seriously challenged in Power Auth. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C.
Cir.), vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss as moot sub nom. American Pub.
Power Ass'n v. Power Auth.,o355 U.S. 64 (1957). The court of appeals refused to give effect
to a Senate reservation to a treaty with Canada concerning the Niagara River. The Supreme
Court vacated that judgment, deciding that the issue was mooted by congressional adoption
of the legislation called for in the reservation by the Senate.
47. See L. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 131-32.
48. See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901) (Senate resolution explaining its understanding of treaty to which it had previously consented without
reservation is without legal effect). See also L. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 136 (once treaty is
ratified, attempts by Senate to withdraw, modify, or interpret its consent have no legal effect).
49. International law recognizes the following circumstances as grounds for terminating
treaties: (1) fulfillment of the obligations of the treaty, (2) expiration of the time period
covered by the treaty, (3) extinguishment of one of the parties to the treaty or of the subject
matter of the treaty, (4) mutual agreement between the parties to end the treaty, (5) conclusion of a new treaty concerning the same subject matter or one wholly inconsistent with an
earlier treaty, (6) denunciation of the treaty by one party with acquiescence by the other, (7)
outbreak of war between the parties, and (8) notice by one of the parties pursuant to the
terms of the treaty. 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 10, at 297; see Nelson, The Termination of
Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States:" Theory and Practice,42 MINN. L.
REV. 879 (1958). See generally C. BUTLER, supra note 12, at 129-37. See also Karnuth v.
United States, 279 U.S. 231 (1928); Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920)
(cases holding treaty expires upon threat of war). A further basis for termination occasionally suggested is the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, defined as "a tacit condition, said to
attach to all treaties, that they shall cease to be obligatory so soon as the state of facts and
conditions upon which they were founded has substantially changed." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1432 (4th ed. rev. 1968); see 5 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33541 (1906). The United States State Department has formulated certain circumstances in
addition to those already discussed: (1) where there has been a severance of diplomatic or
consular relations and such relations are indispensable for the application of the treaty; (2)
where a new preemptory norm of international law emerges that is in conflict with the

1979]

COMMENTS

focused upon in this discussion is the issuance of notice by one of the parties pursuant to the terms of the treaty. In the United States authority to
terminate a treaty through notice is grounded in the Constitution rather
than international law.5" The Constitution, however, fails to state in which
branch of government the treaty-terminating power lies. 5 Confusion
arises because the Constitution apportions certain powers related to for-2
eign affairs among the President, the Senate, and the full Congress.
Thus, with the President granted the power to make treaties, 3 the Senate
granted the power to consent before the treaty becomes binding,54 and the
Congress granted the power to enact all legislation,5 5 to pay the national
debts,5 6 and to regulate commerce with foreign nations,57 there exists language in the Constitution capable of being construed as placing the power
to terminate treaties in all three branches.58 Authorities disagree as to
which branch should prevail;5 9 some argue that the President acting alone
may terminate a treaty in toto, 60 while others contend that effective termination requires congressional or senatorial concurrence. 6' Gene Hackworth, while acting as legal advisor of the Department of State,
summarized:
The question as to the authority of the Executive to terminate treaties
independently of the Congress or of the Senate is in a somewhat confused state. . . . In some cases treaties have been terminated by the
President pursuant to action by Congress. In other cases action has
been taken by the President pursuant to resolutions of the Senate
alone. In still others, the initiative has been taken by the President. In
some cases his action was afterwards notified to the Senate or to both
Houses of Congress and approved, in other cases it was not referred to
treaty; (3) where a state has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of
another state; and (4) where a state's consent to be bound has been procured by the corruption or coercion of its representatives or by the threat or use of force. 125 CONG. REC. S7028
(daily ed. June 6, 1979). For cases holding that treaties cease to operate when there is a
change in essential circumstances, see The Brig William, 23 Ct. Cl. 201 (1888); Hooper v.
United States, 22 Ct. CI. 408 (1887). See generally S. CRANDALL, supra note 19, at 180.
50. Riesenfeld, supra note 8, at 656-58.
51. See Comment, PresidentialAmendmentand Termination of Treaties. The Case of the
Warsaw Convention, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 580, 589 (1967). In other countries, the question of
which organ of government has the power to terminate treaties is rarely asked, as the power
is assumed to be vested in the branch that makes the treaties. See Riesenfeld, supra note 8,
at 658 n.62.
52. Id. at 589; see note 20 supra.
53. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
54. Id. art. II, § 2.
55. Id. art. I, § 1.
56. Id. art. I,§8, cl. 1.
57. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
58. Comment, supra note 51, at 589; see E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 39, at
17 1. See also E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY, supra note 28,

at 135 & n.59.
59. Authorities cited in note 58 supra; see note 8 supra and accompanying text.
60.

See 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 10, at 328.

61. See Riggs, Termination of Treatiesby the Executive Without CongressionalAppro val
The Case of the Warsaw Convention, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 526, 527 (1966). See also S.
CRANDALL, supra note 19, at 460, 465; W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 8.
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either House. No settled rule or procedure has been followed.6 2
A.

Presidential-CongressionalTerminations

The first instance of terminating a treaty by notice occurred in 1846
when Congress passed a joint resolution that authorized President Polk to
annul the convention with Great Britain regarding the joint occupation of
the Oregon Territory. 63 The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations later
stated that although the advice of the Senate alone was sufficient to enable
the President to give notice, the joint assent by both the Senate and House
of Representatives would be an appropriate means of authorizing the President to act. The Committee did not envision the treaty termination power
as resting in the President alone. 64 The first challenge to this view occurred when President Lincoln attempted to terminate a treaty without
congressional approval. 65 Congress responded with a joint resolution declaring the termination invalid unless ratified and confirmed by Congress.6 6 Congress reasoned that as a treaty is part of the law of the land, it
can only be set aside by an act of Congress. 67 The right to terminate treaties, therefore, can be viewed as a legislative prerogative, with only the
power to deliver the congressional decision to foreign governments vested
in the President.6 8 Congress has found judicial support for this view in
Ropes v. Clinch,69 in which the court stated, albeit in a dictum, that Congress may destroy the operative effect of any treaty by giving notice of
termination when the treaty provides for such termination by notice.7"
Several scholars also support the view that Congress should participate
in the treaty termination process. Professor Edward Gaffney, Jr., assistant
62. 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 10, at 330. The quotation is from a letter to President
Roosevelt discussing whether the President, acting alone, could give notice to Italy of the
proposed termination of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1871. Mr. Hackworth
advised that the President could give notice without the advice and consent of the Senate or
the approval of Congress. President Roosevelt adopted this course of action and independently gave notice to terminate the treaty. Id. at 331; see Riggs, supra note 61, at 528-29 &
n.13.
63. 125 CONG. REC. S7025 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
64. S. REP. No. 97, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. (1856).
65. B. GOLDWATER, CHINA AND THE ABROGATION OF TREATIES 17 (1978); see Riesenfeld, supra note 8, at 662.
66. The prevailing attitude of the Congress at this time was that termination of the
Rush-Baggot Convention with Great Britain must stem from congressional action and not
from action taken by the President. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 313 (1865) (remarks
of Sen. Davis); see B. GOLDWATER, supra note 65, at 17-18.
67. Senator Sumner stated that since a treaty is part of the law of the land, it is to be
"repealed or set aside only as other law is repealed or set aside: that is by act of Congress."
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 312 (1865).

68. See Comment, supra note 51, at 599. See also 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 10, at
320-22.
69. 20 F. Cas. 1171 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 12,041).
70. Id.; see Riesenfeld, supra note 8, at 659. See also E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S
CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 15 (1917) (it appears that legislative precedent, which is
generally supported by the Executive, sanctions the proposition that the power of terminating treaties belongs, as a prerogative of sovereignty, to Congress alone and flows naturally
from the power of Congress over treaty provisions in their quality as law of the land).
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director of the Center for Constitutional Studies at Notre Dame Law
School, has stated:
If the President is under the duty, in Article II, to take care, to see
that the laws are faithfully executed, and if then Article VI defines law
to include and to embrace treaties, then it seems to me that the normal
route would be to go back to the House and Senate for a majority
vote, just the normal way that you unmake an act.7 '
Professor Thomas S. Franck, director of the Center for International Studies of the New York University School of Law, is of the opinion that "treaties are the supreme law of the land, that laws and treaties, in the words of
the Supreme Court in Whitney v. Robertson are on the same footing as
laws and must be terminated as if they were laws, either by a legislative
resolution or by inconsistent subsequent law."7 2
Furthermore, Congress has found precedential support in instances in
which the President has received permission from Congress to terminate,
thus implying Presidential recognition of the need for congressional authority to regulate the termination of treaties." The value of this precedent, however, must be weighed against the precedent of treatytermination by the President alone---or in conjunction with the Senate.
The congressional claim to an exclusive power either to terminate treaties
or to consent to termination, therefore, is weakened by the many terminations deemed effective despite the absence of congressional approval.
B.

Presidential-SenatorialTerminations

The method of termination that accords most closely with the language
of the Constitution is termination by the President acting in conjunction
with the Senate, so that the powers exercised in the termination of a treaty
would be the same as those invoked in the making of a treaty.74 In Techt v.
Hughes7 5 a court of appeals upheld the validity of a treaty with AustriaHungary against a challenge that the outbreak of war between the United
States and Austria-Hungary rendered the treaty invalid. The court gave
utmost deference to the treaty, stating in a dictum that the power to denounce a treaty was vested in the President and the Senate, not in the
71. 125 CONG. REC. S7026 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
72. Id.
73. In 1789, Congress passed a resolution abrogating the treaties with France because of
treaty violations by the Government of France. In 1846, a House Joint Resolution was
passed concerning the termination of the Convention on Boundaries with Great Britain.
The Treaty of Commerce with Denmark was terminated by President Pierce in 1864 while
acting pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress. In 1874, a joint resolution was enacted
concerning a treaty with Belgium. In 1883, Congress passed a joint resolution directing
President Arthur to give notice of termination of several sections of an 1871 treaty with
Great Britain. A joint resolution was passed in 1911 authorizing termination of a treaty with
Russia. See B. GOLDWATER, supra note 65, at 19; 5 J. MOORE, supra note 49, at 322; 2 T.
NORTON, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS SOURCES AND ITS APPLICATION 115
(1922); 125 CONG. REC. S7042 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
74. Riesenfeld, supra note 8, at 660; see Taft, supra note 8, at 610 ("the abrogation of
the treaty involves the exercise of the same kind of power as the making of it"). See also S.
CRANDALL, supra note 19, at 461; W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 8, at 561.
75. 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920) (Cardozo, J.).
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judiciary.7 6 In The Amiable Isabella77 the Supreme Court also accepted
the theory that a treaty could be terminated only by the President acting in
concert with the Senate. The Court determined that "the obligations of a
treaty could not be changed or varied, but by the same formalities with
which they were introduced; or, at least, by some act of as high an import,
and of as unequivocal an authority."7
Arguments in support of the Senate's partnership role in termination
compare the making of treaties to the enactment of legislation.7 9 Just as
the power to legislate implies the power to repeal that legislation, so the
Senate's role in the creation of a treaty implies a corresponding role in the
termination of that treaty. This analysis concludes that since a treaty cannot be made without action by both the President and the Senate, 80 a
treaty cannot be terminated without action by the same parties.
Past instances of treaty-termination by the President in conjunction with
the Senate tend to support the view that treaty-termination requires Senate
consent.8 The fact remains, however, that there are instances in which the
President has acted alone in terminating treaties.8 2 Thus, the Senate's
claim of a role in the treaty-termination process, like the congressional
claim, is weakened when considered against past terminations given effect
despite the absence of senatorial consent.
C. PresidentialTerminations
Since 1927, there have been nine instances in which Presidents have
given notice of the termination of treaties without receiving accompanying
congressional authority or seeking ratification from the Senate. The notice
of termination of two of these treaties was voluntarily withdrawn by the
President. 3 Two other treaties were abrogated because they were incon76. 128 N.E. at 192.
77. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1 (1821) (Story, J.).
78. Id. at 75.
79. Comment, supra note 51, at 598-99. This view is shared by Professor Edward Gaffney, Jr. of Notre Dame Law School and Professor Thomas S. Franck of the New York
University School of Law. 125 CONG. REC. S7046 (daily ed. June 6, 1979). See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see text accompanying note 25 supra.
81. In 1855, the Senate unanimously resolved to authorize President Pierce to give notice pursuant to his request that an 1826 treaty with Denmark be terminated. See B. GOLDWATER, supra note 65, at 16; 5 J. MOORE, supra note 49, at 322. In 1920, the United States
withdrew from the International Sanitary Convention of 1903 only after the Senate had
consented to denunciation after being consulted by President Wilson. B. GOLDWATER,
supra note 65, at 22.
82. See text accompanying notes 83-86 infra.
83. In 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt gave notice of termination of an extradition
treaty with Greece due to refusal by that country to extradite an individual accused of fraud.
Following an understanding between Greece and the United States as to future interpretations of the treaty, the notice was withdrawn. President Roosevelt relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Charlton v. Kelly, 299 U.S. 447 (1913), in which the Court recognized the
President's right to terminate or extend a treaty violated by another party. See also 5 G.
HACKWORTH, supra note 10, at 315-16. The second instance occurred in Nov. 1965 when
President Johnson announced that the United States planned to withdraw from the Warsaw
Convention, which dealt with recovery of damages by international air passengers who suf-
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sistent with more recent legislation of Congress,8 4 and one treaty was superseded by obligations of the United States under a later treaty. 5 The
remaining four treaties were annulled or suspended after it became impossible to carry them out effectively. 6
Such independent Presidential terminations are justified on many
grounds. The strongest argument in support of independent Presidential
terminations states that the President has power to terminate treaties based
on an analogy to his power to remove United States officers.8 7 The power
of the President to make treaties, like his power to make appointments of
United States officers, is expressly limited in the Constitution by the provision requiring that he first obtain the advice and consent of the Senate.
These are express limitations upon what otherwise appear to be unlimited
executive powers. In the absence of express limitations upon the power to
remove these officers and the power to terminate a treaty, there is a strong
presumption that no such restrictions were intended by the constitutional
framers.8 8 This argument places great emphasis on the Supreme Court's
fer death or injuries. One day before the effective date of the withdrawal, the President
withdrew the notice. See Comment, supra note 51, at 592-93. See also Riggs, supra note 61,
at 526.

84. In 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt terminated the 1927 Tariff Convention be-

cause it had a restrictive effect on the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. In 1936,

President Roosevelt terminated the 1871 Treaty of Commerce with Italy because its provisions limited the President's ability to carry out the Trade Agreements Act of June 1934.
See Comment, supra note 51, at 592-93. See also Nelson, supra note 49, at 882.
85. In 1939, President Franklin Roosevelt independently terminated the Commercial
Treaty of 1911 with Japan. The President's authority stemmed from acts of war by Japan
toward allied nations. 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 10, at 331. Further, a later treaty, the
Nine Powers Agreement, committed the United States to respect the territorial integrity of
China; therefore, following the Japanese invasion of China, the President was compelled to
terminate the treaty with Japan. See CONG. REC., 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 10750-87 (1939)
(remarks of Senator Schwellenbach).
86. In 1927, President Coolidge gave notice that the 1925 Convention for Prevention of
Smuggling with Mexico was terminated. At the time, alleged religious persecution and confiscation of American-owned private property and oil lands in Mexico were the subject of
emotional debate in Congress. The disruptive climate made it impossible to implement the
convention. See 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 10, at 329. See also B. GOLDWATER, supra
note 65, at 23. In 1939, the State Department gave notice of President Franklin Roosevelt's
intention to terminate the London Naval Treaty of 1936. The treaty was terminated because
of the withdrawal of several other parties to the treaty and the state of war in Europe, both
of which made it impossible to limit naval armaments. See B. GOLDWATER, supra note 65,
at 24. In 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt suspended until the end of World War II the
International Load Line Convention governing ocean shipping. The President relied on
Acting Attorney General Biddle's opinion that fundamental changes in circumstances created an impossibility of performance. Mr. Biddle stated that as the treaty was not being
abrogated, action by the Senate or Congress was not required. See 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra
note 10, at 338-39, 355-56. Finally, in 1955, President Eisenhower gave notice of termination of the 1923 Convention on Uniformity of Nomenclature for the Classification of Merchandise. The notice observed that the convention had been "rendered inapplicabli" since a
fundamental component, the Brussels Nomenclature of 1913, had "become outdated." B.
GOLDWATER, supra note 65, at 25.
87. For a discussion by the Supreme Court of the President's power to remove government officers and employees, see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 181-82 (1974) (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Nelson, supra note 49, at 883-87; see Comment, supra note 51, at 594-95. But see
Riggs, upra note 61, at 533.
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holding in Parsons v. United States8 9 that the President has the power to
remove a United States officer without congressional or senatorial approval.9" The Court further held in Myers v. UnitedStates9' that a statute
passed by Congress that required the advice and consent of the Senate
before the President could remove a United States postmaster was an unconstitutional limitation on the removal power of the President. This analysis concludes that since the President has exclusive power to remove
certain United States officers, 92 he also has exclusive power to terminate
treaties. A counter-argument to this theory emphasizes that the supremacy
clause of the Constitution9 3 declares treaties to be the supreme law of the
land.94 The decision to terminate a treaty, therefore, is arguably a power
of the Legislature and not of the President, even though the interests of the
executive branch in the conduct of foreign relations may be indirectly involved.
A second theory in favor of independent Presidential terminations states
that since the President has emerged with superior authority in the making
of treaties through his exclusive role in treaty negotiation, he has exclusive
authority in the termination of such treaties. 95 This argument is enhanced
by the fact that Senate participation in the entire treaty-making process is
rare.96 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.97 the Supreme
Court supported the President's superior power to make treaties by stating,
in a dictum, that the President "makes treaties with the advice and consent
of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the
Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade." 9 Another related power conceded to the President that also appears to support
independent Presidential terminations is that of communication with foreign governments. The Supreme Court has asserted that "[tlhe President is
the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." 99 Scholars criticize this theory, however, because although the President is the nation's mediator in foreign relations, it
89. 167 U.S' 324 (1897).
90. Id. at 343. The removal power of the President was upheld despite the fact that a
statute provided for tenure.
91. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
92. In Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), the Court restricted
the President's independent power of removal to purely executive as opposed to legislative
or judicial officers.
93. U.S. CONST. art. VI provides: "[A]II Treaties made ... under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land .... "
94. See Riggs, supra note 61, at 533. See also Nelson, supra note 49, at 887-88.
95. See Comment, supra note 51, at 590.
96. See text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
97. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
98. Id. at 319 (dictum).
99. 299 U.S. at 319. This principle was first declared by John Marshall in the House of
Representatives in 1800. 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 613 (1800). This principle has been
repeated often by the Supreme Court. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); Jones v.
United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415,
420 (1830); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see Levitan, Executive Agreements.- A Study of the Executive in the Control of the Foreign Relations of the United States,
35 ILL. L. REV. 365, 372-73 (1940).
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does not automatically follow that he alone is responsible for determining
those policies later conveyed to foreign parties; the President may be simply conveying a decision previously made by Congress."
The President's claim to the power to terminate a treaty independently
also derives support from the constitutional mandate that the President
If a treaty is in conflict
faithfully execute the laws of the United States.'
with a federal law, the one enacted last in time controls the other.° 2 Accordingly, the President may actually be required to terminate a treaty in
order to uphold his constitutional duty. One could question, however,
whether the President is in fact acting alone in terminating a treaty when a
treaty and legislation conflict. Congress may be deemed to have implicitly
consented to the termination by subsequently passing the conflicting legislation. A further consequence of the President's duty to faithfully execute
the laws of the United States is the need to evaluate the continuing vitality
of existing treaties. 0 3 If, therefore, the President discovers that a treaty
has been breached by another party, or has expired because the terms have
been fulfilled, or has become impossible to perform, the President arguably has the authority as well as the duty to terminate such a treaty independently. The right of the President either to terminate or to extend a
treaty violated by another party was recognized in Charlton v. Kel, 1° in
which the Supreme Court upheld the President's right to terminate the
1884 Extradition Treaty with Greece after that country refused to extradite
a citizen.
A final argument in support of the President's power to terminate a
treaty independently is that the President is endowed with certain plenary
and exclusive powers to act unrestrained in the area of foreign affairs unless expressly forbidden by the Constitution.' 5 The basis for this proposition is the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.,106 in which the Court stated, albeit in a dictum, that all
foreign affairs powers available to King George III by way of the royal
100. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 39, at 178 ("while the President alone
may address foreign governments and be addressed by them, . . . in fulfilling these functions he is, or at least may be, the mouthpiece of a power of decision that resides elsewhere").
101. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see Comment, supra note 51, at 593.
102. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); see Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) ("the last expression of the
sovereign will must control"). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962) ("a court will
not undertake to construe a treaty in a manner inconsistent with a subsequent federal statute"). This issue only arises if self-executing treaties that are law of their own accord are
involved. Non-self-executing treaties require congressional legislation before they will be
given effect and, therefore, any inconsistency between such a treaty and federal legislation is
regarded as an inconsistency between two acts of Congress. There is less difficulty, therefore, in concluding the later legislation repeals the earlier. L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 163.
103. See Comment, supra note 51, at 593.
104. 229 U.S. 447 (1913). The President, however, chose to waive the right to terminate
the treaty upon agreement with Italy as to future interpretation. See text accompanying
note 83 supra.
105. Comment, supra note 51, at 595-96; see Riesenfeld, supra note 8, at 665-69. See also
Riggs, supra note 61, at 530.
106. 299 U.S. at 304.
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prerogative devolved directly upon the federal government and, therefore,
could be exercised by the President as attributes of sovereignty.'° 7 Subsequent cases, however, have not been so receptive to this "inherent Presidential powers" theory. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 10 8 the
Supreme Court held that the President could not order the Secretary of
Commerce to seize steel mills during the Korean conflict without specific
authority from Congress or the Constitution. In a well-known concurring
opinion, Justice Jackson rejected the view that the grant of executive
power in article II of the Constitution is a grant of all conceivable power.
He, instead, viewed article II as an allocation to the President of only the
generic powers enumerated.' °9 As to a reservoir of implied, extraconstitutional powers vested in the President, Justice Jackson stated: "The claim
of inherent and unrestricted presidential powers has long been a persuasive dialectical weapon in political controversy. . . . [But] a judge cannot
accept self-serving press statements of the attorney for one of the interested
parties as authority in answering a constitutional question. ' ' 1 o Although
Youngstown concerned Presidential powers in a domestic setting, the
Supreme Court in Reid v. CovertI" devoted a passage to foreign affairs
powers and extended Youngstown by rejecting the existence of a reservoir
of undefined powers not directly traceable to the Constitution for any
branch of government." 2 The Court declared that "the United States is
entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its powers and authority have no
other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed
by the Constitution.''
The arguments both for and against independent Presidential terminations are persuasive, yet no conclusive judicial or historical precedent exists that resolves the issue. Goldwater v. Carter, therefore, presents the
court with an opportunity to decide this issue of which branch possesses
the treaty-termination power.
107. Id. at 315-19.
108. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Court was reviewing power of President in domestic setting,
not in foreign affairs).
109. Id. at 641.
110. Id. at 646-47. Justice Jackson's comments are especially interesting in light of his
statements while acting as Attorney General for President Roosevelt. Then Attorney General Jackson justified the President's seizure of the North American Aviation Co. largely on
the basis of "inherent" powers granted by art. II of the Constitution. See 89

CONG.

REC.

3992 (1943).
111. 354 U.S. 1 (1954).
112. Id.

113. Id. at 5-6. The Court has implicitly overruled the Curtiss-Wright dictum in Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,25-26 (1942) ("Congress and the President, like the courts, possess
no power not derived from the Constitution.") Thus, the Court has returned to the position
taken in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This government is
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers."). See United States v. Floyd Acceptance, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666, 676-77 (1868).
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POSSIBLE RESOLUTION OF THE TREATY-TERMINATION POWER
DISPUTE: GOLDWATER V. CARTER

To understand better the issues raised in Goldwater v. Carter,"4 a closer
look at recent action in the Congress is necessary. On January 15, 1979,
15
Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. introduced a sense of the Senate resolution,
Senate Resolution 15,116 which stated: "Resolved, that it is the sense of the
Senate that approval of the United States Senate is required to terminate
any mutual defense treaty between the United States and another nation.""' 7 This resolution was defeated by the Senate on March 9, 1979,' "
and sent to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations." 9 On May 1,
1979, the Committee reported back Senate Resolution 15, which, as
amended, read:
[Resolved,] [t]hat it is the sense of the Senate that treaties or treaty
provisions to which the United States is a party should not be terminated or suspended by the President without the concurrence of the
Congress except where(1) the treaty provisions in question have been superseded by a
subsequent, inconsistent statute or treaty; or
(2) material breach, changed circumstances, or other factors recognized by international law, or provisions of the treaty itself, give
rise to a right of termination or suspension on the part of the United
States but in no event where such termination or suspension
would(A) result in the imminent involvement of United States Armed
Forces in hostilities or otherwise seriously and directly endanger the
security of the United States Armed Forces in hostilities or otherwise seriously and directly endanger the security of the United
States; or
(B) be inconsistent with the provisions of(i) a condition set forth in the resolution of ratification to a particular treaty; or
a procedure for the termination
(ii) a joint resolution; specif*ing
0
or suspension of such treaty. o
The resolution as amended was brought before the Senate on June 6, 1979,
for consideration. 12 ' During the deliberation by the Senate, Senator Byrd
proposed an amendment to strike out the Committee substitute and re114. No. 78-2412 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 22, 1978).
115. A sense of the Senate resolution is not legally binding on the President. If the President chooses to ignore it, there is no legal recourse that can be had. 125 CONG. REC. S7048
(daily ed. June 6, 1979) (remarks of Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr.).
116. S. RES. 15, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S7044 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
117. 125 CONG. REC. S7044 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
118. See id.at S7022.
119. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations best summed up the task at hand by
stating, "[t]he complexity of the question [of which branch of government has the treaty
termination power] is considerable: the specific intent of the Framers is unclear, the historical precedents inconclusive, the legal precedents inapposite, and the task of formulating a
reasoned and responsible Senate position correspondingly complex." 125 CONG. REC.
S7036 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
120. Id. at S7014.
121. Id.at S7014-53.
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place in lieu thereof his original language. 122 After lengthy debate by both
the opponents 1 23 and proponents 121 of the Byrd amendment, a vote was
25
taken resulting in fifty-nine votes in favor of the Byrd amendment,
27
126
thirty-five votes against, with six members not voting.' Questions then
arose as to the effective date of the resolution and the impact the resolution
would have on President Carter's independent resolution of the Taiwan
Treaty. 28 Senator Frank Church proposed an amendment to Senate Resolution 15129 so that the resolution would read: "Resolved, that it is the
sense of the Senate that, from and after the date of adoption of this resolution, the approval of the United States Senate is required to terminate any
mutual defense treaty between the United States and another nation."' 3 °
At the request of Senator Church, however, no vote was taken on this
amendment.' 3' Thus, the sense of the Senate as of June 6, 1979, is that
fifty-nine of the ninety-four Senators voting on the treaty-termination issue
feel that this power is one shared by both the President and the Senate.
Similar action in the House of Representatives is evidenced by three
House Concurrent Resolutions. Representative George Hansen has introduced House Concurrent Resolution 12,132 which provides for full approval by Congress prior to termination of any post-World War II security
treaties that include mutual defense treaties. The other two resolutions,
House Concurrent Resolution 25,133 sponsored by Representative Bob
122. Id. at S7015.
123. Major opponents of the amendment by Senator Harry Byrd who spoke during the
Senate debate were Senators Church, Kennedy, and Robert Byrd.
124. Major proponents of the Byrd amendment who expressed their views during the
Senate debate were Senators Harry Byrd, Dole, Goldwater, Helms, Huddleston, Humphrey,
Thurmond, and Warner.
125. 125 CONG. REC. S7038-39 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
126. Id.at S7039.
127. Id.
128. Id. at S7048-49.
129. Id. at S7049, S7052.
130. Id. at S7052 (emphasis added). Senator Church proposed an amendment to the
original version of Senate Resolution 15 rather than the Byrd amendment since procedural
technicalities prohibited the Committee substitute as amended by the Byrd amendment to
be changed. All subsequent amendments, therefore, had to be addressed to the original
resolution. Id. at S7047.
131. Id. at S7053. Senator Church requested that no action be taken on his amendment
because of the absence of Senator Javits to whom Senator Church had promised not to
proceed with any action prior to Senator Javits's return to the Senate Chamber following his
attendance at a funeral.
132. H.R. Con. Res. 12, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) provides that:
[I]n accordance with the separation of powers under the Constitution, the
President should not unilaterally take any action which has the effect of abrogating or otherwise affecting the validity of any of the security treaties comprising the post-World War II complex of treaties, without the full and explicit
approval of the Congress.
133. H.R. Con. Res. 25, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) provides that:
[I]n accordance with the separation of powers under the Constitution, the
President shall not unilaterally abrogate, denounce, or otherwise terminate,
give notice of intention to terminate, alter, or suspend any of the security treaties comprising the post-World War II complex of treaties, including mutual
defense treaties, without the advice and consent of the Senate, which was involved in their initial ratification, or the approval of both Houses of Congress.
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Stump, and House Concurrent Resolution 43,134 sponsored by Representatives John Ashbrook and Robert Bauman, provide for Senate participation
in the treaty-termination process or the approval of both Houses of Congress. Both resolutions are limited to post-World War II security treaties.
35
All three resolutions have been referred to committees for deliberation.
These actions in the House of Representatives indicate that the issue of
treaty termination is as alive in that chamber as it is in the Senate. In
addition to the continuing concerns of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the judiciary also has a potential role in resolving the dispute
via the case of Goldwater v. Carter. Underlying this suit is a sense of growing congressional recognition of the possibility of the federal judiciary's
resolving disputes between the legislative and executive branches of government. 36 Individual Congressmen have increasingly chosen the courts,
rather than political processes, as an avenue to challenge the validity of
executive action and policies. 137 There are a number of congressional
suits, however, that have been dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffCongressmen lacked standing to sue since they did not prove injury in
fact.1 38 Following this trend, the district court in Goldwater v. Carterhas
issued a memorandum opinion dismissing the suit without prejudice pending the outcome of the several resolutions on the termination issue now
pending in the Senate.1 39 The court held that due to failure of the plaintiffs to show injury to the Senate as a whole, the plaintiff-Congressmen
134. H.R. Con. Res. 43, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) provides for the same participation
by the Senate and Congress in the treaty termination process as does H.R. Con. Res. 25,
supra note 133.
135. H.R. Con. Res. 12 and H.R. Con. Res. 25 have been referred to the House Committee on International Relations. H.R. Con. Res. 43 has been referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. As of this printing, no action has been taken on any of the bills.
136. Recent Senate approval of a bill establishing the office of Congressional Legal
Counsel to represent Congress in the courts reflects this attitude. S. 495, tit. II, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 12122 (1975); see S. RES. No. 823, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976).
See also Note, CongressionalAccessto the Federal Courts,90 HARV. L. REV. 1632, 1632 n.4
(1977).
137. Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598, 58 L.Ed. 2d 670
(1978); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978); Dole
v. Carter, 444 F. Supp. 1065 (D. Kan. 1977). See Note, supranote 136, at 1633. Jurisdiction
is usually based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976), which provides: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." A potential barrier to congressional suits was removed by Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721, which eliminated the
jurisdictional amount requirement of § 1331 for suits brought against the United States or
any agency, officer, or employee thereof in his official capacity.
138. Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598, 58 L. Ed. 2d 670
(1978); Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975); Metcalf v. National
Petroleum Council, 407 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D.D.C. 1976), at'd on other grounds, 553 F.2d
176 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
139. Senate Resolution 10, sponsored by Senator Dole, was introduced to the Senate on
Jan. 15, 1979, and resolves: "That the Senate disapproves of the action of the President of
the United States in sending notice of termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the
Republic of China." S. Res. 10, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONo. REC. S209 (daily ed. Jan.
15, 1979). Dole's resolution has been referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
A second resolution introduced was Senate Resolution 15 by Senator Harry Byrd, discussed
in detail at notes 114-31 supra and accompanying text. A third resolution now pending is
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lack standing.' 4° The plaintiffs in Goldwater v. Carter, therefore, must establish that there has been injury to the entire Senate before they will be
granted standing to bring a claim of derivative injury and thus clear the
way for the court to proceed to the merits of the case. To understand better this important procedural hurdle facing the plaintiffs, some background
on the issue of standing is necessary.
A.

Standing

The purpose of the standing requirement is to determine whether the
plaintiff is the proper person to raise the issues in a suit 14 ' in order to
ensure that those issues are presented in an adversary context that brings
the legal questions sharply into foCUS.1 42 To attain this purpose, the
Supreme Court has developed several requirements for standing.' 4 3 First,
the plaintiff must allege injury in fact,'" which is defined as a "specific
present objective harm or a threat of future specific harm."' 145 Secondly,
the plaintiff must show that the interest asserted is within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the Constitution or a statute. 146 Thirdly, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that a causal link exists between the action of
the defendant and the harm suffered.' 47 Finally, the injury must be capable of redress by a favorable decision.' 48 These four 49requirements were
reiterated by the district court in Goldwater v. Carter.
Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, sponsored by Senator Goldwater and 21 other co-sponsors,
which provides:
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That, in
accordance with the separation of powers under the Constitution, the President should not unilaterally abrogate, denounce, or otherwise terminate, give
notice of intention to terminate, alter, or suspend any of the security treaties
comprising the post-World War II complex of treaties, including mutual defense treaties, without the advice and consent of the Senate, which was involved in their initial ratification, or the approval of both Houses of Congress.
125 CONG. REC. S7044 (daily ed. June 6, 1979). Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 has been
referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
140. 125 CONG. REC. S7050-52 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
141. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
142. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
143. Standing requirements apply equally to Congressmen and private plaintiffs. See
Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The argument that the official
position of a Congressman entitles him to access to the federal courts has been rejected. See
Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975); Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp.
302, 304 (D.D.C. 1976); Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 264 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
144. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39 (1976); Association
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
145. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972).
146. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). The
"zone of interests" test has been sharply criticized and is thought to have lost its validity. K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.02-. 11 (1976).
147. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976); Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-18 (1973).
148. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). The requirements of causation and likelihood of redress have been viewed as merely two expressions of
the rule that the proper defendant be before the court. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term,
90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 209-10 (1976).
149. For detailed discussion of the district court's initial ruling in Goldwater Y. Carter,see
notes 139-40 supra, 186-94 infra and accompanying text.
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The requirement of injury in fact is the most difficult requirement for a
congressional plaintiff to satisfy in demonstrating standing to sue. Most
Congressmen bringing suits against the executive allege injury in fact to
participatory rights, claiming that the executive has interfered with an interest that belongs to Congress, thereby causing the individual Congressmen to suffer a derivative injury insofar as they share in the impaired
institutional interest.' ° Although participatory suits are novel, the
Supreme Court has accepted, in other contexts, allegations of an indirect
or derivative injury as a sufficient statement of injury in fact.' 5 ' In Warth
v. Seldin15 2 the Supreme Court held that standing was not precluded solely
by indirectness of harm.15 3 The Court futher held in United States v. Students ChallengingRegulatory Agency Procedures 54 that the cases and controversy requirement in the Constitution' 55 is not violated when the
plaintiff is merely one of a group of injured persons. 15 6 Practically speaking, the imputation of injury to each individual Congressman when Congress is harmed is sensible. When the powers or privileges of Congress are
curtailed, each individual member loses his proportionate share of those
powers and privileges. Following this reasoning, the Supreme Court held,
in Coleman v. Miller," 7 that state senators protesting the procedure used to
and adequate interratify a constitutional amendment had a "plain,' direct
58
est inmaintaining effectiveness of their votes."'
Once participatory interests are recognized as valid, the second problem
faced by plaintiff-Congressmen in alleging injury in fact arises in stating
with particularity the injury they have suffered. One decision that has attempted to define what allegations are required is the strongly criticized
opinion of Mitchell v. Laird.59 In Mitchell several Members of Congress
sued for declaratory relief against United States involvement in the Vietnam War. The District of Columbia Circuit held that a statement of injury
in fact was sufficient whenever the relief granted would affect a Congressman's constitutional duties as a Member of Congress.' 61 Other courts
150. Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 467 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,99 S. Ct. 598, 58 L. Ed.
2d 670 (1978); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,436 U.S.
907 (1978); Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975); McClure v. Linowitz,
No. 77-436 (D.D.C., filed May 11, 1977).
151. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
260 (1977) (interest in making suitable low-cost housing available in areas where such housing is scarce is sufficient interest for standing).
152. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
153. Id. at 504-05. See also Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 199 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
154. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
155.

U.S. CONST. art. III.

156. 412 U.S. at 686; see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
157. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
158. Id. at 438; see Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (upholding an
individual Senator's right not to have his vote nullified).
159. 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
160. Id. at 614; see Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 466 & n.15 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,99
S. Ct. 598, 58 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1978), in which the court stated that its statement in Mitchell as
to standing was a mere dictum since the complaint was, instead, dismissed on the grounds
that a political question was presented. See also U.S. CoNsT. art. I (constitutional grant of
power to Congress).
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have strongly criticized this test because it failed to establish the requisite
nexus between the action claimed to be illegal and the injury suffered by
the plaintiff. 6 ' Additional criticism emphasized that the Mitchell test
would permit advisory opinions in violation of the Constitution by focusing solely on the utility of a judgment.' 6 2 Following this reasoning, two
other circuits rejected the Mitchell64decision,' 6 3 as did a different panel of
the District of Columbia Circuit.'
The District of Columbia Circuit attempted to clarify the allegations
necessary to establish injury in fact in Harrington v. Bush. 165 Congressman Harrington sought injunctive relief against use of the secret funding
and reporting provisions of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,166
alleging that he had been injured in fact because his overall effectiveness
as a legislator had been impaired since he could not vote intelligently on
appropriations legislation without knowing whether funds were being used
by the CIA for illegal activities.' 67 The court rejected this claim as too
subjective and concluded that such a standard would establish the courts
as a forum to determine the quality of legislation. 6 ' Accordingly, the
court found that Harrington had not established injury in fact and, therefore, lacked standing. The court further attempted to articulate the necessary requirements for congressional standing. It stated that although the
Constitution grants Congress the responsibility for enacting laws, the responsibility for enforcing those laws is given to the executive.' 69 The court
reasoned, therefore, that plaintiff-Congressmen have an interest only in
legislation and, thus, have standing only when the power to enact legislation has been undermined. 7 ° This rationale is more restrictive than the
District of Columbia Circuit's earlier decision in Kennedy v. Sampson,''
in which a Congressman alleged a violation of his right to vote on legisla161. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 209 n.99 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Metcalf v. National
Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d
455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
162. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to issue declaratory judgments in the
absence of concrete injury, holding that federal courts are precluded from giving advisory
opinions under U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108-10
(1969).
163. Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
164. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 209 n.99 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Note, supra note
136, at 1638.
165. 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
166. 50 U.S.C. § 403(0(a) (1976). Under the Act, CIA funds may be included in the
budgets of other federal agencies without being designated as CIA funds. See Elliot, Cloak
and Ledger.- Is CIA Funding Constitutional?,2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 717, 724-38 (1975).
167. 553 F.2d at 202-03, 211-13.
168. Id. at 212-15; see Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176, 188 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
169. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8, art. II, § 3.
170. 553 F.2d at 212-14. See also McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533, 540 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), appealdismissed sub nom. Buckley v. McRae, 429 U.S. 935 (1977).
171. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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tion. 172 The court in Kennedy focused on whether the Constitution recognized the right allegedly injured, not on whether the plaintiffCongressman's power to enact legislation had been impaired. 173 Although
Kennedy recognizes that other enumerated rights of Congress in the Constitution, in addition to the right to enact legislation, may constitute a basis
for standing if injured in fact, the recent case of Reuss v. Balles' 74 indicates
that Kennedy will be narrowly interpreted. The court in Reuss stressed
that Kennedy by its own language was limited to situations where the vindication of the Senator's vote was his most "essential" interest, and such
interest was asserted
"in the context of a particular dispute about specific
75
legislation."
A final problem faced by plaintiff-Congressmen in alleging injury in fact
is that Congress has the opportunity to pursue political remedies to ensure
that the executive complies with the law. Several courts have declared that
the availability of such alternative remedies means that there can be no
injury in fact to congressional rights or powers and, therefore, have denied
standing. 176 Such reasoning, however, is inconsistent with Kennedy, in
which the ability of Congress to circumvent a pocket veto did not alter the
fact that the veto had been used to interfere with the will of Congress. 177
Under the Kennedy rationale, when there is actual injury to a protected
right, the ability of Congress to pursue an alternative remedy is irrelevant.
Once the plaintiff demonstrates he has been injured in fact, Association
of Data ProcessingService Organizations,Inc. v. Camp178 mandates that
the interest sought to be protected must arguably be within the zone 1 of
79
interests contemplated by either a statute or a constitutional guarantee.
The zone of interests test has been broadly construed so that injury to aesthetic, conversational, and recreational, as well as economic, interests may
be sufficient for standing. 8 ° If a plaintiffs interest is shown to have been
contemplated by a statute or the Constitution, this second test is met.
Should the first two requirements be met, the analysis for standing turns
to the question of causation. The plaintiff must allege "some threatened or
actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action." '' In Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization1 82 the Court summarized
172. In Kennedy, Senator Kennedy challenged the legality of an attempted pocket veto
of a bill for which he had voted.
173. 511 F.2d at 434.
174. 584 F.2d 461, 467 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598, 58 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1978).
175. Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d at 467 (citing Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d at 436).
176. The court in Goldwater applied this theory in finding the plaintiffs had no standing.
See notes 186-94 infra and accompanying text. See also Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d
455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975); Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 407 F. Supp. 257, 260
(D.D.C. 1976), afdon othergrounds, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
177. 511 F.2d at 435 n.17.
178. 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (data processors challenged ruling permitting national banks to
offer data processing services as incident to their banking services).
179. 1d. at 153.
180. Id. at 154.
181. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
182. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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the causation requirement by stating that the injury must be traceable to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not merely to the independent
action of a third party not before the court. If this requirement of causation is not met, the plaintiffs claim fails for want of a proper defendant.
The final standing requirement relates to relief. The plaintiff must show
"an injury . . . that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."' 83
This requirement of a redressable injury ensures that the framing of relief
will be no broader than that which is required by the precise facts before
the court.' 84 Moreover, the test supports the general rule that the plaintiff
must present facts sufficient1 85to show that his individual need requires the
remedy for which he asks.
Applying the above analysis to Goldwater v. Carter,the district court has
held that Goldwater and his fellow Congressmen must meet the above
four-part standing test before the court can proceed to the merits of their
case.' 86 In relation to the injury in fact requirement, all of the plaintiffs,
except former Senator Curtis, claim injury to their constitutional right to
vote and otherwise give advice and consent in terminating the treaty with
Taiwan. 87 Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has held that derivative injury, similar to that which is present where participatory rights are
involved, is sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact requirement, 8 the district court in Goldwater v. Carter held that the availability of alternative
political remedies to redress the allegedly unconstitutional action is evidence that there has been no injury in fact to congressional rights or powers. 189 The court stated that "[a] suit such as this by a group of individual
legislators seeking to vindicate derivative constitutional rights bypasses the
political arena which should be the primary and usual forum in which
such views are expressed."' 9° The court continued, however, and stated
that,
[a]lthough the Court is inclined to agree with plaintiffs' assertion that
the power to terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty is a shared
power to be exercised by the action of both political branches, at the
present time there is no indication that the Congress as a whole intends to assert its prerogative to act. Under these circumstances, the
President's notice of termination does not constitute injury. In the absence of any injury to the institution as a whole, the individual legislators here cannot claim a derivative injury.' 9 '
The first part of the four-part standing test therefore could be met if the
plaintiffs can establish injury to the entire Congress. The question arises as
183. Id. at 26.
184. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974).
185. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 164 (1914).
186. No. 78-2412, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C., filed June 8, 1979).
187. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412, at 3-5 (D.C. Cir., filed Dec. 22, 1978).
188. See text accompanying notes 150-58 supra.
189. No. 78-2412, slip op. at 8, (D.D.C., filed June 8, 1979); see Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d
461, 468 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598, 58 L.Ed.2d 670 (1978); Public Citizen v.
Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1974), afj'dmem., 515 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
190. No. 78-2412, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C., filed June 8, 1979).
191. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
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to whether the vote on Senate Resolution 15, which was subsequent to the
court's decision, is a sufficient expression of the Senate's intention to assert
its prerogative to act. 1 92 It is arguable that since fifty-nine of the ninetyfour voting Senators support the resolution that includes the Senate in the
treaty termination process, 193 the Senate is utilizing the legislative process
to assert its right that it does possess a shared power with the President to
terminate treaties. Thus, the passage of the Byrd amendment could be
evidence of injury to the Senate as a whole since the Senate has been denied the exercise of a congressional power. If such is the case, the individual plaintiffs, or at least the individual Senators, in Goldwater v. Carter
would have standing to claim a derivative injury. As the court states at the
close of its opinion: "If the Senate or the Congress takes action, the result
of which falls short of approving the President's termination effort, then
the controversy will be ripe for a judicial declaration respecting the President's authority to act unilaterally."' 94
Once the plaintiffs have established injury in fact, the other three requirements are easily met. As to the second requirement of whether the
interest asserted by Goldwater v. Carteris within the zone of interests protected by the Constitution, the court need not simultaneously decide the
central issue of whether the Constitution mandates Senate consent or congressional approval in treaty terminations in order to be able to grant
standing. "The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the
party

. . .

and not on the issues

. .

. [to be] adjudicated."' 9 5 The court,

therefore, need only focus on whether the plaintiffs are the proper persons
to request an adjudication of the issue. If the court determines in the first
test that denial of a congressional right to vote and advise the President as
to the termination of the treaty is injury in fact, it follows that the only
proper party to assert that denial of a congressional privilege and power
properly within the zone of interests protected by the Constitution would
be a Congressman. As the interest the plaintiffs seek to protect is properly
within the zone of interests, the second test is met. The additional requirement of a causal link between the defendant's action and the injury suffered is satisfied since there would be no alleged denial of the right to vote
or advise but for President Carter's independent termination of the treaty.
The final requirement mandating that the injury be capable of redress by a
favorable decision is also met, since a judicial declaration that the termination notice is unconstitutional would render the notice invalid, thereby
causing the treaty to remain in force. The President would also be enjoined from impairing the right of the plaintiff-Congressmen to participate
192. It is important to note that Senator Goldwater read pertinent parts of the district
court's opinion, which stressed the court's need to know how the Senate viewed its role in
the treaty termination process, before the vote on the Byrd amendment was taken. 125
CONG. REC. S7033-34 (daily ed. June 6, 1979). Thus, when the 59 Senators voted for the
Byrd amendment, they were aware of the impact their voice would have as a strong indication of how the Senate felt.
193. See notes 114-31 supra and accompanying text.
194. No. 78-2412, slip op. at 10-11 (D.D.C., filed June 8, 1979).
195. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
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in the decision to terminate the treaty, thereby redressing the alleged injury.
Based on the four-part standing test, it appears that the congressional
plaintiffs in Goldwater v. Cartercan sufficiently demonstrate that they have
standing to sue provided they establish injury to the entire Congress. As
the standing requirement is merely designed to assure that the plaintiff has
a personal stake in the litigation so that he is the proper party to raise and
present the issues in an adversary context, the wisest course for the court to
follow is to grant the plaintiffs standing and then consider the peculiar
problems and institutional concerns implicated by congressional suits in
terms of the political question doctrine.' 9 6
B.

Nonjusticiabilityand the Political Question Doctrine

The United States governmental structure of separate powers allocates
the power to decide certain issues to either the executive or legislative
branch of government rather than to the judiciary.' 9 7 This principle is
honored by the judiciary and referred to as the political question doctrine.
Should a political question be brought before the courts, this doctrine requires that the suit be dismissed as nonjusticiable.' 98 Traditionally, political questions are defined as those issues that are textually committed by
the Constitution, either explicitly or by reasonable inference, to the autonomous control of a coordinate branch of government. 9 The textual commitment test envisions two situations in which a court must dismiss a suit
as involving nonjusticiable issues:
(1) when the court finds that the executive or legislature has been
granted sole responsibility for the resolution of the issues in the
suit by virtue of a constitutional provision, or
(2) when the suit challenges an action of the executive or legislature
and the court determines that the coordinate branch has
2 °°not exceeded the scope of a power textually committed to it.
Theoretically, therefore, a court must dismiss a case as nonjusticiable in
that it raises a political question only if the Constitution provides for resolution of the issue by another branch or if the challenged governmental
action is ultra vires.
196. Note, supra note 136, at 1643. For cases that have considered the interrelationship
between standing to sue and the political question doctrine and decided that the standing
issue should be resolved first, see Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 465 n. 14 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 598, 58 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1978); American Jewish Congress v. Vance, 575 F.2d
939, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
197.

Note, supra note 136, at 1643.

198. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177-78 (1803), in which the Court stated: "Questions, in their nature political, or which are,
by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court."
See also Wechsler, TowardNeutralPrincilesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,7-9
(1959).
199. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see Scharpf, JudicialReviewandthe Political

Question.- A FunctionalAnalysis, 75

YALE

200. Note, supra note 136, at 1643.

L.J. 517 (1966).
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The Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr 2"° recognized that "prominent on
the surface of any case held to involve a political question is. . .a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department."2 °2 The Court also recognized two other restraints
on judicial power in addition to the textual commitment test. Where the
issue involves judicially unmanageable standards or delicate policy choices
outside the competency of the judiciary, the court should dismiss the suit
as nonjusticiable.2 °3 This restraint evidences functional concerns of the
Court as to the capabilities of the judiciary. The third restraint centers on
prudential concerns. Both the impossibility of a court's independently
resolving certain issues without expressing lack of respect due the coordinate branches of government, as well as the need to promote consistency in
the form of subsequent judicial support of a political decision, have been
sufficient to convince the Court that issues involving these concerns should
also be nonjusticiable. 2 ' Recently, however, the Court has expressed a
willingness to hear claims that would previously have been barred by these
functional and prudential considerations. 2°5 In both Powell v. McCormack 20 6 and United States v. Nixon 20 7 the Court emphasized that its duty
as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution could not be avoided because of a potential conflict with a coordinate branch.2 8 Thus, Powell and
Nixon suggest that the present Court might be willing to expand the scope
of issues it will decide by recognizing only the textual commitment test as a
bar to justiciability.
The political question doctrine as applied to congressional suits involving participatory rights such as those asserted in Goldwater v. Carterraises
three unique problems. First, there is the argument that congressional
suits by their very nature raise nonjusticiable political questions since they
call for judicial resolution of disputes between the political branches,
which, as mentioned, raises prudential concerns in the mind of the
201. 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see Bonfield, Baker Y.Carr." New Light on the Constitutional

Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 245 (1962). See also McCloskey,
The Supreme Court, 1962 Term-Foreword"The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV.
54 (1962); Neal, Baker v. Carr- Politics in Search ofLaw, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 252.

202. 369 U.S. at 217.
203. Id. at 211-12, 217.
204. Id. at 217, 226; see Bickell, The Supreme Court,1960 Term-Foreword"The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). But see Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive
Virtues--.A Comment on PrincipleandExpediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1964).
205. Note, supra note 136, at 1644; see The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV.
41, 58 n.44 (1974).

206. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). The Court stated: "The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts' avoiding their constitutional responsibility." Id. at
548-49 (footnote omitted).

207. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
208. Id. at 703-05; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), in which
the Court stated: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is." But see Gunther, JudicialHegemony andLegislativeAutonomy: The Nixon

Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 30, 34 (1974) (the rationale in
United States v. Nixon was unnecessarily broad).
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Court.2 09 This rationale was explicitly rejected, however, in Senate Select
Committee on PresidentialCampaign Activities v. Nixon, 210 in which the
appellate court held that the mere fact of a conflict between the legislative
and executive branches over a congressional subpoena does not preclude
judicial resolution of the conflict. Thus, the Supreme Court has occasionally acted as the umpire of the federal system by deciding the "reciprocal
rights and duties" of the Congress and the executive.2 1'
A second problem is that congressional participatory suits ask the court
to resolve the dispute irrespective of the plaintiffs recourse to available
political remedies. The concern here is functional since the courts want to
avoid excessive reliance on the courts by not tempting legislators to bypass
the political process.2 12 Moreover, by ignoring political remedies in favor
of judicial intervention, the development of a stronger working relationship between Congress and the executive would be impeded as there
would be less incentive to work out compromises if it were known that the
courts would intervene and settle the dispute. 213 The district court in Goldwater v. Carter shared these same concerns, as evidenced by the court's
statement that "[a] suit such as [Goldwater v. Carter] by a group of individual legislators seeking to vindicate derivative constitutional rights bypasses
the political arena which should be the primary and usual forum in which
such views are expressed. ' 21 The court, however, indicated in a dictum
that if the Senate or Congress would take action that "[fell] short of approving the President's termination effort, then the controversy [would] be
ripe for a judicial declaration respecting the President's authority to act
unilaterally."2 15
Finally, congressional participatory suits may also serve ulterior political motives. Congressmen could seize upon such suits and their attendant
publicity to demonstrate zealousness on behalf of their constituency.21 6
Threats to bring suit could become a powerful weapon, enabling Congressmen to exchange acquiescence on the issue in question for concessions on
other matters. 2 "7 The courts, therefore, are justified in being wary of participatory suits since there is potential for abuse and manipulation for par209. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-92 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 214-15 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
210. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), in
which the Supreme Court resolved a similar conflict between the executive and judicial
branches, thereby establishing justiciability of such conflicts.
211. See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 676 (1929) (veto power of President cannot
be narrowed by Congress); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Congress may not
interfere with President's power of removal of United States postmaster). See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 660 (1952) (Burton, J., concurring) (President invaded jurisdiction of Congress by ordering Secretary of Commerce to seize nation's
steel mills).
212. See Levi, Some Aspects of SeparationafPowers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 387 (1976).
213. Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term-Foreword" On PresidentialPrivilege, 88
HARv. L. REV. 13, 38 (1974).
214. No. 78-2412, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C., filed June 8, 1979).
215. Id.
216. Note, supra note 136, at 1649.
217. Id. at 1649-50.
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tisan purposes.
The above problems with congressional participatory suits suggest, as a
solution, a per se rule against hearing such suits. An alternative might be
to assess the justiciability of such suits on a case-by-case basis by balancing
the need to enforce the cohstitutionally protected rights of individual Congressmen against the danger of interfering with or preempting a political
solution.21 9 Such an alternative, however, would place great demands on
the judiciary since it would require the courts to be constantly aware of
pending political action and, at times, to anticipate congressional reaction. 220 The courts, therefore, should hesitate to decide participatory suits
brought by individual Congressmen when the full Congress has yet to express its will; otherwise, the court would be allowing a single Congressman
to usurp the role of Congress.
The political question doctrine presents a possible barrier in Goldwater v.
Carter to resolution of the controversy over where the treaty-termination
power lies, although the district court has indicated in a dictum that,
should the Senate or Congress manifest its disapproval of the President's
termination, the controversy would be "ripe for a judicial declaration respecting the President's authority to act unilaterally., 22 By applying only
the textual commitment test as expressed in Powell v. McCormack222 and
United States v. Nixon,22 3 the issue should be declared justiciable because
the Constitution does not place the power to resolve this issue in either the
executive or legislative branch. Assuming, therefore, that the court does
proceed to the merits in Goldwater v. Carter, it must decide the validity of
of
the three major arguments presented by the plaintiffs in their challenge
22 4
independently.
treaty
Taiwan
the
terminate
to
power
the President's
C. Arguments Raised in Goldwater v. CarterAgainst Independent
PresidentialTerminations
The first argument is based on the language of the Mutual Defense
Treaty, which provides that either party may give notice of termination.22 5
The plaintiffs argue that the term "party" does not refer to the President
218. Id. at 1650.
219. Id. at 1651. The courts have frequently been sensitive to congressional activity and
have been guided by the recognition of possible legislative action with respect to an issue or
refusal of the legislature to overrule a judicial decision by statute. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (Court should not decide whether
gender-based classifications deserve strict scrutiny under fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis in view of proposed equal rights amendment to Constitution); Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) (refusal of Congress to alter the exemption of baseball from
antitrust laws).
220. "It is rather like the old commerce clause question of whether Congress is silently
silent or silently speaking." Note, supra note 136, at 1651.
221. 125 CONG. REC. S7051 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
222. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
223. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
224. All statements by the district court in Goldwater as to the existence of a shared
power are dicta and, therefore, are of no binding effect. The actual holding of the court was
only that the plaintiffs lacked standing for failure to establish injury in fact.
225. See note 2 supra.
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alone but rather refers to the President acting in conjunction with the Senate or both Houses of Congress.2 26 Plaintiffs contend that there is no evidence in the negotiations leading to the signing of the treaty nor in the
Senate proceedings prior to consent indicating that the term "party" meant
the President acting alone.22 7 Moreover, the plaintiffs emphasize that article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 228 defines "party"
as "a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which
the treaty is in force.",229 Thus, the plaintiffs conclude that "party," as used
in the treaty, refers to the State, and this presumably includes the Senate or
the full Congress rather than the President alone. This argument is not
persuasive, however, because even if "party" is defined in the treaty to
include the Senate or the full Congress, it does not follow that the treatytermination power is constitutionally vested in the Senate or Congress.
be0 found in the Constitution
The authority to terminate a treaty must 23
rather than in the terms of the treaty itself.
The plaintiffs' second argument is based on the Dole-Stone amendment
to the International Security Assistance Act of 1978,231 which provides that
"[ilt is the sense of the Congress that there should be prior consultation
between the Congress and the executive branch on any proposed policy
changes affecting the continuation in force of the Mutual Defense Treaty
of 1954. " 232 This amendment was adopted by Congress and the entire Act
was subsequently signed into law by President Carter on September 26,
1978, three months prior to the termination of the treaty with Taiwan. The
Dole-Stone amendment obviously gives the court a clear expression of
congressional intent to require congressional consultation prior to termination. The court in Goldwater v. Carter, however, rejected the plaintiffs'
argument of a violation of their statutory right, inferred by this Act, to be
consulted by the President as to policy changes concerning the Taiwan
Treaty. The court found the final language of the amendment to be too
general in nature to allow the court to resolve effectively the question of
how much consultation would meet its terms if the amendment was in fact
binding. The court did not, however, rule on the question of whether the
amendment was outside the authority of Congress. In Myers v. United
States2 33 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a joint resolution
that provided for congressional approval of any removal of a United States
postmaster by the President because it usurped the removal power of the
President.2 34 If the court proceeds to the merits of the case and determines
226. Petition by Plaintiffs, Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 22,
1978).
227. Id.

228.
39/27.
229.
230.
231.
§ 2151).
232.
233.
234.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
Id.
See Riesenfeld, supra note 8.
Act of Sept. 26, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, 92 Stat. 746 (to be codified in 22 U.S.C.
Id.
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
See text accompanying notes 87-92 supra.
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that the President does have the power to terminate treaties independently,
the Dole-Stone amendment could be found to be an unconstitutional restriction by Congress on the treaty-termination power of the President.
Finally, the plaintiffs contend that since a treaty is the supreme law of
the land,23 5 and since the Constitution assigns the President the duty to
faithfully execute the laws of the land, 236 any attempt by the President to
terminate the Defense Treaty is in direct violation of his sworn duty and
obligation to uphold the laws. 237 This argument, however, may be questioned. Since .recognition of a foreign government and establishment of
diplomatic relations with that government are clearly executive functions, 238 it was within the President's authority to recognize Communist
China as the official government of China and to cease recognition of Taiwan. If the United States no longer recognizes Taiwan independently of
Communist China, it is arguable that no government exists with which to
continue diplomatic relations. Since the President's duty to faithfully execute the laws requires him to evaluate the continuing vitality of existing
laws,23 9 this duty may actually compel him to terminate the treaty because
of impossibility of performance.
The strongest argument by the plaintiffs in Goldwater v. Carter lies in
precedential support. Consideration by the court of testimony presented to
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations as to the history of treaty terminations by the United States 24 ° led the court to state, albeit in a dictum,
that although some treaties have been terminated by the President acting
alone, "these Presidential terminations have been in situations in which it
might be inferred that the Congress had no reason to question Presidential
action.",24 ' The court continued by stating: "Based on the Court's consideration of these historical precedents, the Court believes the power to terof this
minate treaties is a power shared by the political 24branches
2
government, namely, the President and the Congress.,
The above discussion of the arguments raised in Goldwater v. Carter
reveals a classic battle between the two political branches of the federal
government. Congress, through passage of the Dole-Stone amendment
and the vote on the Byrd amendment in the Senate, has stated its position
that the President must consult with Congress, or at least the Senate,
before terminating a treaty. President Carter, by independently giving notice to terminate the treaty, has expressed his position that the President
235. U.S. CONST. art. IV; see note 27 supra.
236. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 provides: "[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be

"
faithfully executed .
237. See Petition by Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 3.
238. See J. HERVEY, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
INTERPRETED BY THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (1928), reprinted in 9 INTERNA-

TIONAL LAW AND HISTORY REPRINT SERIES 19-20 (I. Kavass and A. Sprudz eds. 1974)

(recognition is placed in the hands of the executive where it logically belongs).
239. See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra.
240. Resolution Concerning Mutual Defense Treaties- Hearing on S. Res. 15 Before the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1979).
241. 125 CONG. REC. S7051 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
242. Id.
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has the exclusive power to terminate a treaty. Attention, therefore, turns to
the judiciary for a possible solution to this stalemate. As previously discussed, the major barriers to resolution of this issue are standing to sue and
the political question doctrine. Should the plaintiffs establish that there is
injury to the Congress as a whole, the court will likely grant standing. Focus would then be on whether the issue is justiciable.2 43 Since the Constitution does not commit resolution of this issue to the legislative or
executive branch, the court would have to rely on the prudential and functional concerns to dismiss the suit as nonjusticiable. 2" Should the court
determine that the issue is nonjusticiable, it is arguable that the court
would be implicitly agreeing that the President does have the power to
terminate the treaty independently, even though a dismissal of the suit
would have no precedential value for that proposition. As the situation
now stands, the President has sent notice to terminate the treaty. Should
the court not interfere, the treaty will be terminated, and, more importantly, the President will have increased support for his view that the President does have the power to terminate treaties without interference from
the Senate, the full Congress, or the judiciary. Goldwater v. Carter, therefore, presents two options to the court. If the suit is decided on the merits,
the court will make a major statement as to the role of the judiciary when
the executive and legislative branches are stalemated. If the suit is dismissed as nonjusticiable, however, dismissal will be an implicit affirmation
that an important part of the President's role in foreign affairs is beyond
judicial scrutiny and, instead, is to be decided by a political confrontation
between the Congress and the executive, or ultimately by citizens at the
ballot box. As the Supreme Court stated in UnitedStates v. Richardson,2 45
although the traditional electoral process may be "[s]low, cumbersome,
and unresponsive. . . at times, our system provides for changing members
of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a sufficient
number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent
in performing duties committed to them."246
V.

CONCLUSION

The issue of whether the power to terminate treaties belongs to the President alone, the President and the Senate, or the President and Congress
has been a source of controversy for many years. With a direct challenge
to the President's power to terminate a treaty independently now pending
in Goldwater v. Carter,this issue finally may be resolved. Should the court
grant standing and proceed to the merits of the case, the court will be making an important statement as to the role of the judiciary in resolving disputes between the legislative and executive branches. Should the court,
243. See generally Taiwan Suit Hits Snag, But Backers Encouraged,65 A.B.A.J. 1031

(1979).
244. See text accompanying notes 197-208 supra.
245.

418 U.S. 166 (1974).

246. Id. at 179.

1979]

COMMENTS

761

however, deny standing or invoke the political question doctrine and,
thereby, dismiss the suit as raising a nonjusticiable issue, the court will be
implicitly indicating that the issue of which branch of government has the
treaty-termination power is left to be resolved by the political processes
available in our system of government.

